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Abstract 
In this note we empirically analyze the link between state capacity and civil conflict via the manufacturing sector, 
which is the source of wealth for emerging new elite interested in obtaining political representation, and is the outcome 
of a new political equilibrium more in tune with capital accumulation. This raises the cost of civil conflict, reducing its 
probability of occurrence. We find evidence in favor of our hypothesis in a panel of African countries.
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1. Introduction 
In this note we empirically analyze the link between state capacity and civil conflict. The 
channel between the two is operationalised by the manufacturing sector, which is the source 
of wealth for an emerging new elite interested in obtaining political representation, and is the 
outcome of a new political equilibrium more in tune with capital accumulation. This raises 
the cost of civil conflict, reducing its probability of occurrence. We apply this reasoning to a 
panel of African countries over the period 1970-2007.  
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we review the relevant literature and 
exploit this link, and in Section 3 the empirical model, the data and the results are presented. 
Section 4 concludes.   
 
2. Literature review 
The literature on civil conflict stresses the role of three issues: income per-capita, institutional 
quality and state capacity. We link these three issues with manufacturing. 
 Poorer countries tend to experience more civil conflict. According to Fearon (2007) 
and Besley and Persson (2010), young and poor individuals are more likely to pursue 
violence if the opportunity-cost of conflict would be lower than the benefits of the status quo. 
Therefore, higher income per-capita increases risk-aversion, reducing the probability of 
violence. Two factors affect individual behaviour: on the one hand, the ability of the state to 
counteract the insurgence, on the other hand the amount of wealth to get. In particular, natural 
resources, linked with lower institutional quality, cause bad governance, inequality of wealth 
distribution, and elite insulation, which favour fragility, conflict and appropriation (Collier 
and Venables, 2009). Aghion et al. (2004) pointed out that an insulated political elite can 
redistribute wealth to his own benefit. In fragile states a small number of groups win and the 
others loose. Group differences are linked with several fractures: ethnical origins, socio-
economic status, and history, for example between colonizers and colonized. These 
cleavages, in absence of a political system able to absorb them, can contribute to the 
emergence of civil conflicts.   
 From a different point of view, insulated elites emerging from the colonial juncture 
can negatively affect growth. As shown by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, 2008), powerful 
groups have no incentives in promoting economic growth because it could lead to the 
expansion of other groups: they could build another power able to balance those of the 
current leading group. Such effect has historical evidence in the cities of Medieval Italy, and 
in the agricultural, proto-industrial and industrial growth of England from the 16th to the 18th 
century (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008) where emerging groups were able to reduce the 
insulation of the most powerful groups and to reform the institutions in a more inclusive way. 
In this perspective we can have a better understanding of the poor performance in protecting 
property rights and enforcing contracts in fragile countries.    
 Besley and Persson (2008, 2009) define ‘state capacity’ as the institutions devoted to 
enforce property rights and contracts and to raise taxes, and consider ‘legal’ and ‘fiscal’ state 
capacity. Both are inherited from the investments made in the past in order to increase their 
value. They affect the capacity of the state to design markets and efficient taxation with 
positive effects on the production and distribution of public goods and on income levels. In a 
situation of both political insulation and low investments in fiscal and legal capacities, elites 
can increase their own insulation getting rid of the right to use public goods and redistribution 
for loosing groups. In this way income inequality is related with the origin of the groups. At 
the same time, if natural resources take a large share of production, the fiscal insulation of the 
elite is higher because their revenues are directly managed by the groups in charge of the 
state and not directed towards the population, further reducing accountability as shown by 
Bornhorst et al. (2008). 
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 In Besley and Persson (2010) this model is related with the incidence of civil 
conflicts. The basic idea is that under low insulation, a democratic political system, a good 
level of minorities’ protection, high income and a good system of taxes and transfers and 
allocation of public goods there is a lower probability of experiencing civil conflicts. In 
contrast, an unequal system can end up in two possible situations: repression or civil war. The 
latter arises when the leading group feels itself under threat because another one in increasing 
his productivity and wealth, and therefore reacts through repression. The former takes place 
when the disadvantaged group uses violence that, together with the willingness of the 
incumbent to keep the power, leads to civil conflict. The authors identify a relationship 
between the quality of legal and fiscal institutions and the income level, showing that the 
joint effects of these three dimensions contribute to the emergence of civil conflict.     
 Consider, now, a situation in which groups excluded from power in fact control over 
an expanding manufacturing sector. Firstly, capital accumulation will benefit both the 
capitalists – through profits – and workers – by paying higher wages with respect to the 
primary sector because of higher productivity. The growth of income per-capita will increase 
the opportunity-cost of civil conflict, reducing the probability of its outbreak. Higher income 
and wealth will also make this novel group of manufacturers a new power that will try to 
achieve political representation. The elite can: 1) contrast this quest through repression, 
ending up in a civil conflict that will destroy capital and production; 2) accept the power of 
the new group including it in the political system.1 This is viable if the benefit from sharing 
power is higher than the expected value of a fight, which includes the possibility of a 
complete loss of power.  
 Increased political participation will also affect state capacity. On the one hand, there 
will be better protection of property rights, contracts and a more egalitarian distribution of 
public goods, improving the economic activity. On the other hand, a stronger secondary 
sector will make the government budget less dependent on agricultural products, which are 
typically poorly taxed and have a strong volatility of their prices, affecting revenues from 
export. This is even truer for natural resources. The new industrial elite will be more 
interested in the taxation/public goods package, pushing towards a system more favourable to 
accumulation.  
 We, therefore, highlight a three-way mechanism affecting civil conflict. A stronger 
manufacturing sector will have a direct effect by increasing income and making conflict less 
likely; indirectly, it will reduce the political, legal and fiscal insulation of the system. In turn, 
higher political competition can improve the fiscal and legal effectiveness of the state, 
making it more able to increase production and income. The final outcome is a reduction of 
civil conflicts.2  
 
3. Model, data and results 
We estimated the following panel data logit model: 
 
Civilwarit = α1 + α2 Xit + α3 Zit + α4 Wit + εit     (1) 
 
The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one in case of civil conflict and zero otherwise. 
Data are derived from Lacina and Gleditsch (2005).3 The vector Xit includes the added value 
of the agricultural, manufacturing and mining sectors as a percentage of GDP (taken from 
                                                 
1 This typically leads to the extension of the franchise. 
2 Caruso (2010) follows an argument similar to ours within the traditional theory of conflict (guns and butter, to 
which he adds ice-creams).  
3 The dataset is available at http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets (accessed in July 2010). 
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UNCTAD), the vector Zit includes economic variables such as openness over GDP and GDP 
per capita (taken from Heston et al., 2009), and Wit includes a measure of ethnic 
fragmentation (Alesina et al., 2003), democracy (Polity IV project, Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2009)4 and a dummy variable for sub-Saharan 
countries. Finally, εit is a random error. All estimates are obtained by using random-effect 
probit panel data. 
 Results in Table 1 show that manufacturing is negative and significant, as predicted 
by our argument. The behaviour of the other variables is consistent across estimates, and in 
general quite similar to the one found in the literature. A higher share of GDP coming from 
natural resources increases the probability of conflict, as it is well known in the “resource 
curse” literature; the same holds for per capita GDP, since higher income increases the cost of 
conflict. Higher openness also decreases the probability of conflict, possibly because of 
higher competition that increases the cost of conflict. An interesting result concerns 
government spending, which positively affects conflict. The level of democracy also reduces 
the possibility of civil conflict.  
 Sub-Saharan countries do not behave differently from North African countries, and 
also ethnic fragmentation is not significant. The share of GDP devoted to agriculture is also 
insignificant. 
 
    Table 1 – Civil war 
 (1) (2) (3)
Agriculture 0.011 0.011 0.011
 (1.80) (1.76) (1.84)
Manufacturing -0.031 -0.031 -0.031
 (2.00)* (1.99)* (2.01)*
Mining 0.036 0.036 0.036
 (4.49)** (4.58)** (4.65)**
Democracy -0.012 -0.012 -0.012
 (5.52)** (5.53)** (5.49)**
Openness -0.013 -0.013 -0.013
 (4.21)** (4.34)** (4.41)**
Ethnic Fragmentation 0.558 0.394
 (0.67) (0.53)
Sub-Saharan countries -0.258
 (0.44)
GDP per capita -0.019 -0.019 -0.019
 (3.33)** (3.33)** (3.36)**
Constant -2.544 -2.645 -2.364
 (3.41)** (3.70)** (4.92)**
Observations 1793 1793 1826
Loglikelihood -605.905 -606.000 -615.734
Wald χ2 100.33** 100.30** 99.56**
Likelihood-ratio test for 
ρ = 0 
314.14** 316.18** 323.31**
     Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
 
                                                 
4 This index is bounded between -10 and 10, where 10 means perfect democracy. 
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4. Conclusions 
In this note we argued that manufacturing is a key element in determining state capacity by 
providing both financial resources through taxation for investments and public goods, and by 
creating a new class of entrepreneurs that are interested in better governance and a more 
competitive political market. We have tested our prediction on a panel of 53 African 
countries over the period 1970-2007, and we found that the share of the manufacturing over 
GDP is negatively related with the occurrence of conflict. 
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